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STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Robert Scott Ashbey appeals the district court's orders denying his motions to suppress in
his three separate cases. He argues the evidence in each of his three cases was obtained as the
result of an officer's unlawful prolonging of traffic stop to facilitate a dog sniff, in violation of
his Fourth Amendment rights. As correctly found by the district court, the officer requested the
dog handler to conduct an exterior sniff of the vehicle, and chose to act as safety backup for the
dog handler instead of returning to his patrol car and running the license checks. However, the
district court erroneously concluded that detaining Mr. Ashby and the driver for the dog sniff
was constitutionally reasonable because the officers had "information" that Mr. Ashbey might be
transacting in narcotics. The district court ruled in the alternative, also erroneously, that there
was no unlawful prolonging because the normal traffic-related tasks could have been completed
within the same timeframe as the dog sniff
In his Appellant's Brief, Mr. Ashbey argued that district court erred in concluding the
officers' "information" justified the brief detention to conduct the dog sniff, because the State
failed to present a sufficient factual basis to support a reasonable suspicion of drug activity or
other criminal activity. The officers' "information," which the officer attributed to unspecified
"street sources," was bare-bones, and according to the holdings in Alabama v. White, 496 U.S.
325, 330 (1990), and State v. Bishop, 146 Idaho 804, 811 (2009), lacked the requisite indicia of
reliability to meet the Fourth Amendment's reasonable suspicion standard.

(See Appellant's

Br., pp.14-18.)
As to the district court's alternative ruling - that the traffic related tasks "could have"
been completed within the same timeframe as dog sniff and therefore the officer's conduct did

1

not unlawfully prolong the stop - Mr. Ashbey argued that the court's rationale was expressly
rejected in Rodriguez v. United States, 575 U.S. 348 (2015), and State v. Linze, 161 Idaho 605
(2016), and that the court's factual findings are also unsupported by the record. (Appellant's
Br., p.12.)

Mr. Ashbey asked this Court to reverse the district court's orders denying

suppression, and to remand all three of his cases to the district court.
The State responds by arguing that, notwithstanding the district court's finding that the
officer had decided to act as safety back up "instead of' running the license checks, the officer
was "dutifully engaged in the traffic investigation up until the time the drug dog alerted on the
car." (Resp. Br., p.10.) Next, the State argues that, even if the officer extended the stop beyond
its traffic mission, the officer had information that supported a reasonable suspicion that justified
a drug dog sniff

(Resp.Br., pp.14-15.)

Finally, and relevant only to the evidence in

Mr. Ashbey's third case - the drugs found at the jail- State argues that the denial of suppression
as to the contraband can be affirmed based on the attenuation doctrine. (Resp.Br. pp.19-20).
This Reply Brief is necessary to respond to the State's arguments.

Statement of the Facts and Course of Proceedings
The statement of the facts and course of proceedings were previously articulated in
Mr. Ashbey's Appellant's Brief

They need not be repeated in this Reply Brief, but are

incorporated herein by reference thereto.
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ISSUE
Did the district court err in denying Mr. Ashbey's motions to suppress?

3

ARGUMENT
The District Court Erred When It Denied Mr. Ashbey's Motions To Suppress

A.

Introduction
The district court erred as a matter of law when it concluded that Officer Nordman did

not violate Mr. Ashbey's Fourth Amendment rights. As argued in the Appellant's Brief, the
officer prolonged the traffic stop beyond his traffic mission, and the officer's bare-bones
"information" purportedly obtained from "street sources" was inadequate to justify the extension
of the detention.

(Appellant's Br., pp.9-19.)

Specifically, Mr. Ashbey argued that Officer

Nordman had unlawfully prolonged the stop for approximately fifty seconds when, as expressly
found by the district court, "instead of' running the license checks, Officer Nordman "chose to
stand and act as cover for Officer Bangs [the canine handler] while he had the canine do the
search." (Tr., p.102, Ls.2-12.) (Appellant's Br., pp.II, 12.)

The district court's finding is

supported by the officer's testimony that:

"I chose not to retreat back to my vehicle, access my computer. Instead, I
allowed Officer Bangs to conduct his exterior sniff of the vehicle while I
essentially was safety and stood with both the defendant and the driver."
(Tr., 69, L.20- p.70. L.5 (emphasis added).) (Appellant's Br., p.11.)
Despite the district court's factual fmding and the officer's sworn testimony that Officer
Nordman was acting as safety to allow the dog sniff "instead of' performing the license checks,
and despite the absence of any evidence that he was investigating the tum signal violation or
writing a citation, the State has asserted that, during this same time, Officer Nordman was in fact
"dutifully engaged in the stop's traffic investigation" by "attending to related safety concerns."
(Resp. Br., pp.7, 10-15.) As set forth below, the State's arguments are unavailing and should be
rejected.
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B.

The Rationale Of State v. McGraw And State v. Renteria Do Not Apply Here Because
Officer Nordman Was Not Continuously Investigating The Traffic Violation Or
Conducting The Ordinary Inquiries
In support of its position that acting as safety back up for the dog sniff did not extend the

traffic stop, the State cites the Court of Appeals' decisions in State v. McGraw, 163 Idaho 736,
741 (Ct. App. 2018), and State v. Renteria, 163 Idaho 545, 459 (Ct. App. 2018). (Resp.Br., pp.913.) However, both of these cases are easily distinguishable.
In McGraw, a traffic stop case, the Court of Appeals held that an officer providing safety
cover for a dog sniff while at the same time continuously writing a traffic citation did not extend
the duration of the traffic stop. Id. at 741. In Renteria, also a traffic stop case, the Court of
Appeals held that an officer's unrelated inquiries and tasks did not extend the duration of a traffic
stop, because at the same time, the officer was conducting the ordinary inquiries incident to the

traffic stop: gathering the driver's proof of insurance; walking back to his patrol car to run the
license checks; and waiting for a return of information from dispatch.

Id. at 459. In both

McGraw and Renteria, the officer was performing the tasks of his traffic mission: writing the
citation, and conducting the ordinary inquiries.
By contrast, while Officer Nordman was acting as backup for the dog sniff in this case,
he was performing no tasks that were included within his traffic mission. Rather, as testified to
by the officer and expressly found by the district court, Officer Nordman chose to act as safety
backup for the dog sniff "instead of' returning to his patrol car to conduct the ordinary inquiries
of running the relevant license checks, and thus instead of concluding the traffic stop. (Tr., p.69,
L.20 - p.70. L.5.) Unlike the officers in McGraw and Renteria, Officer Nordman was not
performing duties related to the traffic mission while facilitating the dog sniff Consequently,
even if during the time he was facilitating the dog sniff, Officer Nordman made inquiries that
had some relation to officer safety, such inquiries did not relate to the investigation or citation for
5

the turn signal violation, but instead were safety measures related to facilitating the dog sniff As
recognized by the Court of Appeals, the Idaho Supreme Court, and the U.S. Supreme Court,
"safety precautions taken in order to facilitate investigation of other crimes, outside of
the traffic mission, are not justified as part of a routine traffic stop." State v. Jacobsen, 166
Idaho 832, _, 464 P.3d 318, 321 (Ct. App. 2020) (quoting Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 365); see also
Linze, 161 Idaho at 609 (same). Thus, Officer Nordman's inquiries during the time he was
acting as back up fell outside of his original traffic mission.
Moreover, and as demonstrated in the following section, Officer Nordman's specific
roadside questioning of Mr. Ashbey and the driver during the fifty seconds at issue do not
constitute the type of "safety concerns," "officer safety measures," or "precautions" needed in
order for an officer to safely perform his traffic mission, and therefore were not authorized as
part of the mission's related safety concerns.
C.

The Record Fails To Support The State's Claim That While Officer Nordman Was
Acting As Safety Backup For The Dog Sniff, The Officer Was Also Diligently Pursuing
The Turn-Signal Violation
According to the State, while Officer Nordman was standing at the roadside and acting as

a safety backup for the dog sniff, he was also advancing the stop's original traffic mission - i.e.,
investigating the turn signal violation - by attending to the mission's "related safety concerns."
(Resp.Br., p.10.) Specifically, the State asserts that during the first forty seconds of that fiftysecond period, before the dog alerted, Officer Nordman was attending to the mission's related
safety concerns by: (1) asking the occupants, ''Nothing illegal inside of the vehicle?"; (2) asking
the driver to confirm that she was "unsure of the blue pill" taken from her pocket during the
previous search of her person; and (3) instructing Mr. Ashbey not to use his phone and telling
him it was "an officer safety issue." (Resp.Br., pp.3, 12.) The State argues that the last ten
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seconds of the fifty second period "does not count" because the driver had asked what was going
on, and the officer took that ten seconds to explain to Mr. Ashbey and the driver that they were
being detained pending the outcome of the dog sniff. (Resp. Br., pp.7, 10-15.)
As shown below, the State's assertions are not supported by the record, by the district
courts findings, or by the controlling Fourth Amendment precedent and should therefore be
rejected.

1.

The Officer's Question, "Nothing Illegal Inside Of The Vehicle?" Was Not A
Safety Concern Related To The Mission Of The Original Traffic Stop

Contrary to the State's assertion (Resp. Br., p.11), Officer Nordman's question, "Nothing

illegal inside of the vehicle?" does not fall within the scope of a safety concern related to the
traffic stop, because the question fails to address any safety issue that stemmed from the traffic
infraction. Nor has the State shown, by officer testimony or other evidence, that the question
was a necessary "precaution" taken by the officer "in order to complete the mission safely."

Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 365. (See generally Tr.) First, and most obvious, Officer Nordman did
not ask if there was anything "dangerous" in the car, or if there were "weapons," or potentially
hazardous or harmful items.

(See Ex.A.) Rather, the officer asked only if there was anything

"illegal." (See Ex.A.) It is not illegal for persons to carry weapons, and in Idaho, it is not illegal
to carry firearms, either openly or under concealment. See IDAHO CONST. art. I, § 1; LC. § 183301 et seq. 1
As its sole authority in support of its claim, the State cites to a federal trial court's
decision from West Virginia, wherein the trial judge reasoned that asking if there was anything
illegal in the car was related to officer safety because "the question could expose dangerous

1

There is nothing in the record to indicate that the officer had any knowledge that either
Mr. Ashbey or the driver was disqualified from legally possessing firearms. (See generally Tr.)
7

weapons or narcotics." United States v. Buzzard, 395 F.Supp.3d 750, 745 (S.D.W.Virginia
2019). That ruling is incorrect. While the decision purports to rely on a federal appeals court
decision, United States v. Everett, 601 F.3d 484, 495 (6 th Cir. 2010), see Buzzard, 395 F.Supp.3d
at 745, the appeals court case only permits questioning about "dangerous weapons" and whether
a driver "has a gun." Everett, 601 F.3d at 495.
Rather, and contrary to the West Virginia trial court decision, and contrary to the position
taken by the State on appeal, an investigation into whether a persons are in possession of
"anything illegal" is precisely the type of questioning the United States Supreme Court has held
to be outside of the officer's traffic mission. Rodriguez, 575 U.S. 348, 356-57 (holding that "onscene investigations in to other crimes" detours from the traffic mission); see also United States
v. Campbell, 912 F.3d 1340, 1353 (11th Cir. 2019)2 (stating that "diligence does not provide an

officer with cover to slip in a few unrelated questions," and holding that an officer who asked
questions about contraband and drugs violated the defendant's Fourth Amendment rights);
compare State v. Floyd, 898 N.W.2d 560, 569 (Wis. 2017) (holding that an officer's question

about whether the driver "had any weapons or anything that could harm him" was related to
officer safety, and therefore related to the mission of the stop.)
The State also cites to Floyd in support for its position, but, unlike the officer in Floyd,
Officer Nordman did not ask about "weapons" or items that could "harm him." See 898 N.W.2d
at 569.

Officer Nordman asked instead if there was anything illegal in the car, which has

nothing to do with guns or weapons, but is a question aimed at the detection of criminal activity.
See Campbell, 912 F.3d at 1353.

As emphasized by the United States Supreme Court in

2

The Idaho Court of Appeals has quoted from Campbell with approval, albeit from a different
sentence in Campbell. See State v. Still, 166 Idaho 351, 458 P.3d 220, 225 (Ct. App. 2019).
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Rodriquez, "officer safety interests are interests different in kind from the Government's

endeavor to detect crime in general or drug trafficking in particular." 575 U.S. 348, 356-57.
Officer Nordman's inquiry had nothing to do with weapons, guns, or potentially dangerous items
but was specifically directed to "illegal" items, and thus, the detection of crime. The inquiry is
thus not justified as related to the safety of the mission. Id.
Also significant is the timing of Officer Nordman's question. When he asked, "Nothing
illegal inside of the vehicle," Officer Nordman had already removed both occupants away from
their vehicle. (Ex.A, at 4:58 - 5:10). Officer Nordman had already instructed the dog handler,
Officer Bangs, to "go ahead" and run the dog, and already decided he would stand by and act as
a safety backup. (Ex.A, 4:58 - 5:57.) At that point, to the extent that the question, "nothing
illegal inside the vehicle" was in some way, somehow, a necessary officer safety precaution, it
was a precaution taken for the safety of the officers conducting and facilitating the dog sniff, and
not a precaution taken in relation to suspended tum-signal investigation. Under the holdings of
Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355, and Linze, 161 Idaho at 609, safety precautions taken in order to

facilitate a dog sniff fall outside of the mission of the original stop.
2.

The Officer's Question, "You're Unsure About The Blue Pill?" Was Not A Safety
Measure Related To The Tum-Signal Violation And Exceeded The Mission Of
The Traffic Stop

The State next asserts that Officer Nordman's question to the driver, "you're unsure
about the blue pill found that was found inside your coin pocket?" was a safety measure taken in
pursuit of the original traffic violation. (Resp. Br. pp.IO, 11.)

According to the State, the

observation of the pill presented a "related safety concern" that warranted additional questioning,
for "safety reasons." This assertion is incorrect for multiple reasons. First, the assertion that a
single blue pill presents any type of safety concern is pure speculation by the State. Officer
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Nordman provided no testimony articulating any safety concern connected to his apparent
discovery of a blue pill. (See generally Tr.) Additionally, although Officer Nordman had asked
the driver if she was unsure what the pill was (see Ex.A), there is no testimony from Officer
Nordman that he was unsure of the identity of the pill, or that he otherwise had any factual basis,
be it in his training or experience, from which to draw an inference that the presence of the pill
presented a safety concern to the officer or to others. (See generally Tr.) Nor is there any
testimony or other evidence that the appearance of the pills was consistent with substances that,
if ingested, can impair driving; in fact, there was no mention whatsoever of blue pills during the
suppression hearing or in any of the officer's reports. (See generally Tr.; ConfExhibits, pp.2-18;
Tr.) The State's suggestion that the pill presented a safety concern that justified the officer's
question is not supported by the record. Thus, notwithstanding the State's speculation on appeal,
the record in the district court provides no factual basis that connects the officer's inquiry about
the pill to the safety of the officer or others. For this reason, the State's assertion fails. Accord
State v. Burgess, 165 Idaho 109, 114 (Ct. App. 2018) (where record failed to demonstrate that

the officer's inquiry was necessary for officer safety in continuing to carry out the purpose of the
stop).
The State also cites State v. Hays, 159 Idaho 476, 481 (Ct. App. 2015), as support for its
argument. However, Hays bears no resemblance to this case. There, the Court of Appeals
concluded that an officer's extensive inquiries regarding a defendant's obvious excessive
nervousness was "safety related" and justified questioning. Id. The Court's "safety concern"
regarding the driver derived from the officer-observed behavior of the driver, and the officer
testified at the suppression hearing regarding his observations and concerns with the driver's

"nervousness." Id. In the present case, there is no evidence that the driver exhibited concerning

behavior, and no testimony that Officer Nordman had any concern about the driver, either based
on his observation of the driver, or his observation of a blue pill. (See generally Tr.)
Moreover, contrary to the State's assertion (Resp.Br., p.11), a concern for the safety of
the traveling public does not fall within the scope of a safety concern related to the mission of the
traffic stop. The "related safety concerns" that may be addressed as part of the officer's traffic
mission are, as explained by the U.S. Supreme Court, refer to the "officer safety interest" that
"stem[] from the mission of the stop itself" Rodriguez, 575 U.S. at 355. "A seizure for a traffic
violation justifies a police investigation of that violation." Linze, 161 Idaho 605, 608 (2016)
(quoting Rodriguez, at 355) (emphasis added.) The stop remains a reasonable seizure only so
long "as the officer diligently pursues the purpose of the stop to which the reasonable suspicion
is related." Linze, at 609 (emphasis added). Thus, Linze and Rodriguez make clear that, beyond

the investigation of the traffic violation for which the stop was made - here, a tum signal
infraction - and the "ordinary inquiries incident" there to, an officer may not expand his
investigation into other possible traffic safety code violations or more serious crimes, absent
independent reasonable suspicion.
3.

The State Has Not Shown That Officer Nordman's Instruction That Mr. Ashbey
Stay Off His Phone Was An Officer Safety Precaution

The State next argues that Officer Nordman was acting out of a concern for officer safety
"related to the traffic stop" when he instructed Mr. Ashbey not to make calls or send texts.
(Resp.Br.,p.12.) This argument should also be rejected. First, because Officer Nordman had
suspended his investigation of the tum signal violation while he was acting as safety back up for
the dog sniff, whatever safety measures he might have taken were not related to the tum signal
violation but necessarily aimed at allowing him to carry his backup function safely.
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Second, although Officer Nordman can be heard on his bodycam recording telling
Mr. Ashbey that not using the phone was an "officer safety issue" (Ex.A), the State provided no
officer testimony showing in fact that was true, or showing how, when, or why directing vehicle
occupants to stay off their phones during routine traffic stops is needed for officer safety. (See
generally Tr.) Nor has the State cited any authority showing that forbidding occupants the use of

their mobile phones during a routine traffic stop is a typical or constitutionally reasonable officer
safety measure. The State's has cited to Milledge v. State, 811 S.E.2d 796 (S.C. 2018), a South
Carolina case involving reasonable suspicion to conduct a weapons frisk, which has little
relevance to the issue here. In Milledge, the officers testified that based on their training and
experience, the defendant's attempt to make a phone call was relevant to whether he posed a
threat to officer safety. Id. The South Carolina Court held that the officer testimony was one of
a "mosaic" of factors (including that the defendant was extremely nervous, with hands shaking
so much he could not dial the number), to be considered by a reviewing court to determine
whether the officers had reasonable suspicion to justify a Terry frisk. Id. at 803. The discussion
in Milledge is irrelevant to this case, however, because not only are the cases factually dissimilar,
the State presented no officer testimony connecting the use of a phone with any officer safety
issue. (See generally, Tr.)
On the other hand, citizens generally have a First Amendment right to film officers
engaging in their duties, and citizens do this using their cell phones. See e.g., Glik v. Cunniffle,
655 F.3d 78 (1st Cir. 2011). Thus, in the absence of officer testimony establishing a basis for
linking an officer's instruction not to use a cell phone with officer safety interest, the State
cannot establish that Officer Nordman's instruction to Mr. Ashbey was an officer safety
precaution. The State's argument should be rejected.

12

4.

The Officer's Explanation To The Occupants That The Stop Was Being Extended
Pending The Results Of The Dog Sniff Did Not Justify Extending Their Detention
For The Dog Sniff

The State does not attempt to claim that Officer Nordman was advancing the mission of
the traffic stop during the last ten seconds of Mr. Ashbey's extended roadside detention. During
most of those ten seconds, Officer Nordman was explaining to Mr. Ashbey and the driver that
they were being detained pending the results of the dog sniff (Ex.A.) Rather, the State argues
that last ten seconds should not count because prior to the officer's explanation, the driver had
asked "what's going on?"

(Ex.A.) (Resp.Br., pp.3, 12.)

The State's argument should be

rejected.
It has already been established that, for the full fifty seconds that he detained Mr. Ashbey
and the driver at the roadside before the dog alerted, Officer Nordman had been acting as backup
in order to facilitate a dog sniff. (Tr., 69, L.20 - p.70. L.5; p.102, Ls.2-12.) Thus, to come
within the holdings and rationale of McGraw and Renteria, the State must show that while
facilitating the dog sniff, Officer Nordman was also diligently pursuing the mission of the traffic
stop. McGraw, 163 Idaho at 741; Renteria, 163 Idaho at 459. However, the officer's telling
Mr. Ashbey and the driver that they are being detained so that the dog can sniff the car, and will
remain detained pending the result of the sniff, in no way shows that the officer was pursuing the
investigation of the tum signal violation. The State's argument should be rejected.
The State cites the Court of Appeals' unpublished decision in State v. Dewitt, N. 46524,
2020 WL 374362 (Ct. App. January 23, 2020), as authority that supports its position.
(Resp.Br., p.12.) The State's reliance on Dewitt in misplaced. First, Dewitt is an unpublished
decision, and not properly cited to any court as precedent or as authority, as stated on the face of
that opinion. Id. Moreover, the reasoning in Dewitt has no application here. In Dewitt, the
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Court of Appeals ruled that lengthening of the stop attributable to defendant's search for
prescription bottles was not attributable to the officer, and thus did not unlawfully prolong the
stop. Id. In Dewitt, the stop was extended because the officer was waiting on the defendant. Id.
In the present case, by contrast, it is undisputed that Mr. Ashbey was being detained for the last
ten of that fifty seconds, because Officer Nordman was waiting on the results of the dog sniff.
(Tr., p.69, L.20 - p.70. L.5; p.102, Ls.2-12.) Thus, Mr. Ashbey's detention was unlawfully
prolonged during this ten-second period also.
D.

The State Failed To Carry Its Burden Of Showing That Extending The Stop To Conduct
A Dog Sniff Was Justified By Reasonable Suspicion
As argued in his Appellant's Brief, the officers' "information" that Mr. Ashbey and his

roommate were selling narcotics from their apartment, was "bare-bones" and insufficient to
provide reasonable suspicion. (Appellant's Br., pp.14-18.) In its response, the State argues that
there are additional facts the provided the officer with a reasonable suspicion of crime,
specifically, an "unidentifiable blue pill" and a "makeshift weapon." (Resp.Br., p.14-15.) With
respect to these "additional facts," the State's argument is fatally flawed, as the officer never
articulated any criminal suspicion based on those facts.
As made clear by the Idaho Supreme Court in State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho 667, 772
(2019), and by the Court of Appeals in State v. Bly, 159 Idaho 708, 710 (Ct. App. 2016), an
officer is required to articulate what criminal suspicion he had, based on his observations. Thus,
while "[ a]n officer can utilize law enforcement training to draw reasonable inferences based
upon objective facts to justify his or her suspicion that criminal activity is afoot," the officer

must, at the very least, articulate how and why his training and experience has lead him draw
such inferences.

Bly, 159 Idaho at 710 (declining to find reasonable suspicion based on

defendant's conduct, where "the officer articulated no basis justifying why the defendant's
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conduct" "was consistent with criminal activity"); see also Gonzales (holding "[t]he fatal flaws
in the State's case are that [the officer] never articulated what criminal suspicion he had of
Gonzales' behavior.").
Here, though the comments captured by Officer Nordman's bodycam suggest that he saw
a blue pill when he searched the driver, and that the driver said she did not know what it was,
there is no indication in the record that Officer Nordman had attached any significance to either
of those facts; there is no testimony as to why any reasonable officer could. (See generally Tr.)
Officer Nordman never mentioned those facts, in either his po lice report or at the suppression
hearing. (See generally ConfExhibits, pp.2-18; Tr.) There is a complete lack of any officer
testimony that the pill the officer found, or the driver's statement that she did not know what it
was, were in anyway indicative of or consistent with criminal activity. (See generally Tr.)
Likewise, there is no officer testimony or any other evidence that Officer Nordman's
observation of a potential weapon on the front seat console in the vehicle, was indicative of or
consistent with criminal activity. Officer Nordman testified to his concern that the item was
within reach of both the driver and Mr. Ashbey, and as such presented an officer safety concern.
(Tr., p.29, Ls.1-6.) However, the officer provided no testimony articulating any connection
between the presence of the weapon and any particularized criminal activity. (See generally Tr.)
The sole factual basis articulated by the officer, and on which he based his belief of criminal
activity, was the information provided by the unidentified "street sources." (Tr., p.5, Ls.16-21;
Conf.Exhibits, p.10.) As demonstrated in the Appellant's Brief, at pages 14-19, that information
was insufficient to support a reasonable suspicion to justify the extended detention of
Mr. Ashbey. Therefore, because reasonable suspicion was absent, Officer Nordman's extension
of the traffic stop to conduct a drug investigation violated Mr. Ashbey's Fourth Amendment

15

rights. Linze, 161 Idaho at 608-09. The district court's contrary conclusion was error as a matter
oflaw.
E.

Suppression Should Have Been Granted In All Three OfMr. Ashbey's Cases; The State's
Attenuation Argument, Which Is Preserved Only As To The Third Case, Should Be
Rejected
With respect to the evidence discovered in the jail, and relevant to the suppression of the

evidence in Mr. Asbhey's third case only, 3 the State has argued that the district court's denial of
suppression may be affirmed based on this Court's application of the attenuation doctrine.
(Resp. Br., p.15.) As noted in the parties' respective briefing, in the district court, the prosecutor
argued the application of the doctrine to the evidence discovered at the jail, but because the
district court ultimately found no Fourth Amendment violation, and because that ruling was
dispositive in all three of Mr. Ashbey's motions, the district court did not reach the attenuation
issue.
Mr. Ashbey asserts that, based on the flagrancy and purposefulness of Officer Nordman's
misconduct, this Court should conclude, as a matter of law, that the subsequent discovery of the
evidence at the jail was not sufficiently attenuated, and that the evidence should have been
suppressed. Alternatively, Mr. Ashbey argues that his third case, Appeal No. 47253, should be
remanded to the district court with instructions that the district court determine the application of
the doctrine.

3

The attenuation doctrine is an exception to the exclusionary rule and must be argued and
established by the State in the district court or else it is waived. State v. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho
667, 673 n.3 (2019). As noted in the Appellant's Brief, page 5, and as acknowledged by the
State (Resp.Br., p.15 note 6), the State argued in the district court the attenuation exception
applied only as to the drug evidence found at the jail (see Appeal No. 47253, R., pp.70-72).
Accordingly, the State has waived any argument that the doctrine applies as an exception to the
exclusion of any other evidence in either of the two cases. Gonzalez, 165 Idaho at 673.
16

1.

This Court Should Conclude That The Officer's Conduct Is Sufficiently
Attenuated

"[T]he indirect fruits of an illegal search or arrest should be suppressed when they bear a
sufficiently close relationship to the underlying illegality." New York v. Harris, 495 U.S. 14, 19
(1990). The Idaho Supreme Court has held there are three factors for a court to consider when
determining whether unlawful conduct has been adequately attenuated to remove the illegal taint:
"(1) the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence, (2) the
occurrence of intervening circumstances, and (3) the flagrancy and purpose of the improper law
enforcement action." State v. Cohagan, 162 Idaho 717, 722 (2017). Id. (citation omitted.)
However, in conducting this weighing, no single factor is dispositive of attenuation. Brown v.

Illinois, 422 U.S. 590, 603 (1975).
Mr. Ashbey acknowledges that the first and second factors - elapsed time and occurrence
of intervening circumstances - weigh in favor of attenuation, but not so heavily as claimed by
the State.

Regarding the elapsed time, the testimony indicates that the officer intentionally

delayed the arrest of Mr. Ashbey, resulting in the delay of his jailing. Thus, while "the period of
time to consider is the elapsed time between the misconduct and the acquisition of the evidence,"

Cohagan, 162 Idaho at 722, the elapse of fifty days does not tell the whole story here. The
record shows, as Mr. Ashbey argued below, that the officer had extended his original misconduct
into the application for the arrest warrant, directly using the illegally obtained evidence to
procure that warrant and arrest and jail Mr. Ashbey. (Tr., p.33, L.15 - p.37, L.10.) Under these
circumstances, the period of time between Mr. Ashbey's arrest on the constitutionally invalid
warrant, and the discovery of the contraband at the jail, while arguably favoring attenuation, does
not do so heavily.

17

Critically, however, and contrary the State's assertion, the third factor strongly favors
exclusion because the officer's misconduct was both flagrant and purposeful.

Mr. Ashbey

asserts that, based on the flagrantly unlawful misconduct of the officer in his case, this Court
should conclude, as it did in Cohagan, that "the discovery of the evidence was not sufficiently
attenuated from the illegal stop as to break the causal chain between the unconstitutional stop
and the discovery of the evidence." 162 Idaho at 726.
The purpose of the exclusionary rule, as it relates to the Fourth Amendment, is to deter
police misconduct. Id. at 722-23. Accordingly, the third factor favors exclusion only "when the
police misconduct is most in need of deterrence-that is, when it is purposeful or flagrant." Id.
(quoting Utah v. Striejf, _U.S._, 136 S.Ct. 2056, 2061 (2016).
The State argues that Officer Nordman's conduct, like the officer's in Striejf, was only
"negligent," not purposeful or flagrant. (Resp.Br., p.19.) However, Strieff differs factually from
Mr. Ashbey's case, and those differences are sufficient to warrant suppression. Mr. Nordman
submits that the facts of his case more closely resemble those in Cohagan, where due largely to
the flagrancy and purposefulness of the officer's violation, the Court found there was not
sufficient attenuation to remove the taint, and the exclusionary rule applied. 162 Idaho at 726.
Like the officer in Cohagan, Officer Nordman's misconduct was flagrant and purposeful.
The with no more than a bare-bones allegation not amounting to reasonable suspicion, Officer
Nordman set out to follow and seize citizens to investigate them for possible evidence of drug
trafficking activity at the location they were watching. The officer did so with the express intent
to generate evidence of probable cause to obtain a search warrant for the residence, and to make
future multiple arrests. (Tr., p.77, Ls.13-25.) Then, rather than arrest Mr. Ashbey at the scene,
Officer Nordman sought a warrant using that unlawfully obtained evidence, providing law
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enforcement with another opportunity to seize and search Mr. Ashbey. As he argued to the
district court, the series of events starting on December 21, and overseen by Officer Nordman,
resulted in this series of criminal cases against Mr. Ashbey. (See Appeal No. 47253 R., pp.6465.)

Given the way in which these criminal were built upon each other, compounding the

compound the ongoing law enforcement actions, the exclusionary rule would simply be given lip
service if it did not apply to the seriously aggravated set of circumstances. (See Appeal No.
47253 R., p.65.) As it did in Cohagan, this Court should find that in Mr. Asbhey's case, "such
purposeful conduct is simply untenable and is exactly the type of flagrantly unlawful conduct the
Fourth Amendment is designed to protect against." 162 Idaho at 724. Accordingly, the district
court's denial of Mr. Ashbey's motion to suppress the evidence found at the jail should be
reversed, as the evidence obtained was the indirect fruit of the officer's constitutionally unlawful
conduct.

2.

Alternatively, This Court Should Remand Mr. Ashbey's Third Case With
Instructions

Alternatively, if this Court is unable to conclude there is insufficient attenuation as to
evidence found at the jail, Mr. Ashbey requests that this Court remand his third case, Appeal No.
47253, with the instruction that the district court consider and rule on the attenuation issue.
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CONCLUSION
The district court erred in failing to conclude that the stop was unlawfully prolonged, in
violation of Mr. Ashbey's Fourth Amendment rights. For the reasons argued in his Appellant's
Brief, and those set forth herein, Mr. Ashbey asks this Court to reverse the district court's order
denying his motions to suppress in his three cases, vacate his judgments of conviction, and
remand his cases to the district court for further proceedings, consistent with the terms of his
plea agreements.
DATED this 18th day of September, 2020.
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